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SYMPOSIUM ON LAW REFORM
I. THE COURTS: INTERWEAVERS IN
THE REFORMATION OF LAW*
R. J. TRAYNOR

It is the current vogue to endorse law reform as our
forerunners once endorsed the status quo. The very term
law reform now conveys assurance, like a miracle fabric,
that all will be well as soon as it is pressed or unpressed
into service. If one fabric fails, the facile remedy is to fabricate another and another via the legislative process.
Receptive though we may be to an abundance of new
riches in the law, we cannot let them accumulate in such
haphazard heaps that they confuse the law at the expense
of rational reform. Hence, as legislatures increase their
already formidable output of statutes, courts must correspondingly enlarge their responsibility for keeping the law
a coherent whole.
Ordinarily a legislature makes much more law in a
session via statutes than a court does over a long period of
time via the painstaking application or adaptation of common law rules and the occasional innovation of a new one.
By definition legislators are the experimental lawmakers,
free to draft laws on a massive scale or ad hoc in response
to what they understand to be the needs of the community
or the community of interests they represent. The legislators
themselves are experiments of a sort; they are on trial until
the next election and must prove in the interim that they
can make laws acceptable to their time and place, even
though many of them may not be lawyers.
What a legislature does, however, it can undo without
much ado. If some of its purported miracle fabrics fail to
prove miraculous, they need no longer remain on the
* Text

of an address by Chief Justice R. J. Traynor of the

Supreme Court of California, in the course of a symposium
on Law reform held in conjunction with the official opening

of the Law Building at the University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, September 23, 1967.
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shelves. We can lament that they sometimes do, but we
need not despair; they rarely survive indefinitely. Bumbling
though the legislative process may be, it is more readily
self-correcting than the judicial process. Given its flexibility,
we can accept amiably that when a legislature is good, it
can be very, very good, but that when it is bad, it is horrid.
We can also in some measure resign ourselves to how ingeniously it sometimes abstains from any action, how mysteriously it sometimes moves its wonders not to perform. We
can reconcile ourselves to its swings of quality so long as
the people exercise responsibly their power to keep it a
do-gooder, a reformer of the law.
It could not be otherwise in the modern world that for
better or worse the legislatures have displaced courts as
our major lawmakers. We have come a long way from the
time when courts were on guard to keep statutes in their
place, in the shadow of precedent. In most of their affairs
people who seek out new rules of law now look to the next
legislative session, not to the day of judgment. In street
wisdom, it is easier to legislate than to litigate. A legislature can run up a law on short notice, and when it has
finished all the seams it can run up another and another.
It is engaged in mass production; it produces piecework of
its own volition or on order. The great tapestry of Holmes's
princess, the seamless web of the law, becomes ever more
legendary.
Whatever our admiration for ancient arts, few of us
would turn the clock back to live out what museums preserve. The law of contracts was once well served by delightful causeries of learned judges that clarified the meaning of
obligation. Such causeries, however, proved inadequate to
provide an expansion and diversification of words to correspond with that of business enterprise. Thus it fell to the
legislators to spell out whole statutes such as insurance codes
and the uniform laws dealing with negotiable instruments,
sales, bills of lading, warehouse receipts, stock transfers,
conditional sales, trust receipts, written obligations, fiduciaries, partnerships, and limited partnerships.
There followed in the United States another development, a state-by-state adoption of the Uniform Commercial
Code, the culmination of years of scholarly work sponsored
by the American Law Institute and the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws. Such statutes can take a bird's-eye
view of the total problem, instead of that of an owl on a
segment. They can encompass wide generalizations from
experience that a judge is precluded from making in his
decision on a particular case. Legislatures can break sharply
with the past, if need be, as judges ordinarily cannot. They
avoid the wasteful cost in time and money of piecemeal
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litigation that all too frequently culminates in a crazy quilt
of rules defying intelligent restatement or coherent application. They can take the initiative in timely solution of urgent
problems, in contrast with the inertia incumbent upon
judges until random litigation brings a problem in incomplete form to them, often too soon or too late for over-all
solution.
As the legislators tend their factories replete with
machinery for the massive fabrication of law, judges work
away much as before at the fine interweaving that gives
law the grace of coherent pattern as it evolves. Paradoxically, the more legislators extend their range of lawmaking,
of statutory innovation and reform at a hare's speed, the
more significant becomes the judge's own role of lawimaking, of reformation at the pace of the tortoise. Even at a
distance from the onrushing legislators they can make their
presence felt. It has been known since the days of Aesop
that the tortoise can overtake the zealous hare; La Fontaine
has noted that it does so while carrying a burden. The
frailty of the hare is that for all its zeal it tends to become
distracted. The strength of the tortoise is its very burden;
it is always in its house of the law.
Unlike the legislator, whose lawmaking knows no
bounds, the judge stays close to his house of the law in the
bounds of stare decisis. He invariably takes precedent as
his starting-point: he is constrained to arrive at a decision
in the context of ancestral judicial experience; the given
decisions, or lacking these, the given dicta, or lacking these,
the given clues. Even if his search of the past yields nothing,
so that he confronts a truly unprecedented case, he still
arrives at a decision in the context of judicial reasoning with
recognizable ties to the past; by its kinship thereto it not
only establishes the unprecedented case as a precedent for
the future, but integrates it in the often rewoven but always
unbroken line with the past.
Moreover, the judge is confined by the record in the
case, which in turn is confined to legally relevant material,
limited by evidentiary rules. So it happens that even a
decision of far-reaching importance concludes with the
words: "We hold today only that . . . We do not reach the
question whether .

.

." Circumspectly the weaver stops, so

as not to confuse the pattern of transition from yesterday
to today. Tomorrow is time enough for new weaving, as the
facts of tomorrow come due.
A decision that has not suffered untimely birth has a
reduced risk of untimely death. Insofar as a court remains
uncommitted to unduly wide implications of a decision, it
gains time to inform itself further through succeeding
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cases. It is then better situated to retreat or advance with a
minimum of shock to the evolutionary course of the law,
and hence with a minimum of shock to those who act in
reliance upon judicial decisions. The greatest judges of the
common law have proceeded in this way, moving not by
fits and starts, but at the pace of the tortoise that steadily
makes advances though it carries the past on its back.
The very caution of the judicial process offers the best
of reasons for confidence in its recurring reformation. A
reasoning judge's painstaking exploration of place and his
sense of pace, give reassurance that when he takes an
occasional dramatic leap forward he is impelled to do so
in the very interest of orderly progression. There are times
when he encounters so much chaos on his long march that
the most cautious thing he can do is to take the initiative
in throwing chaos to the winds. The great judge Mansfield
did so when he broke the chaos of stalemated contractual
relations with the concept of concurrent conditions. Holmes
and Brandeis did so when they cleared the way for a liquidation of ancient interpretations of freedom of contract that
had served to perpetuate child labor. Cardozo did so when
he moved the rusting wheels of Winterbottom v. Wright'
to one side to make way for Buick v. MacPherson." Chief
Justice Stone did so, in the chaotic field of conflict of laws,
when he noted the leeway in the United States Constitution
between the mandate of the full faith and credit clause and
the prohibition of the due process clause.
To a reasoning judge, each case is a new piece of an
ever-expanding pattern, to be woven in if possible by reference to precedent. If precedent proves inadequate or inept,
he is still likely to do justice to it in the breach, setting
forth clearly the disparity between the square facts before
him and the usually benign precedents that now fail to encompass them. He has also the responsibility of justifying
the new precedent he has evolved, not merely as the dispossessor of the old, but as the best of all possible replacements. His sense of justice is bound to infuse his logic. A
wise judge can strengthen his overruling against captious
objections, first by an exposition of the injustice engendered
by the discarded precedent, and then by an articulation of
how the injustice resulted from the precedent's failure to
mesh with accepted legal principles. When he thus speaks
out, his words may serve to quicken public respect for the
law as an instrument of justice.
1 (1842) , 10 M. & W. 109.

(1916), 111 N.E. 1050.
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He is hardly eager to take on such tasks if he can do
otherwise. He knows that a new rule must be supported by
full disclosure in his opinion of all aspects of the problem
and of the data pertinent to its solution. Thereafter the
opinion must persuade his colleagues, make sense to the
bar, pass muster with scholars, and if possible allay the
suspicion of any man in the street who regards knowledge
of the law as no excuse for making it. There is usually someone among them alert to note any misunderstanding of the
problem, any error in reasoning, any irrelevance in data,
any oversight of relevant data, any premature cartography
beyond the problem at hand. Every opinion is thus subject
to approval. It is understandable when a judge, faced with
running such a gamut, marks time instead on the line of
least resistance and lets bad enough alone.
Moreover, he may still be deterred from displacing an
inherently bad or moribund precedent by another restraint
of judicial office - the tradition that courts do not ordinarily innovate change but only keep the law responsive to
significant changes in the customs of the community, once
they are firmly established.
The tenet of lag, strengthening the already great restraints on the judge, is deservedly respected. It bears
noting, however, that it is recurringly invoked by astute
litigants who receive aid and comfort from law that is safely
behind the times with the peccadillos of yesteryear and has
not caught up with their own. At the slightest sign that
judge-made law may move forward, these bogus defenders
of stare decisis conjure up mythical dangers to alarm the
citizenry. They do sly injury to the law when the public
takes them seriously, and timid judges retreat from painstaking analysis within their already great constraints to
safe and unsound repetitions of magic words from the legal
lore of the year before much too long ago.
Too often the real danger to law is not that judges might
take off onward and upward, but that all too many of them
have long since stopped dead in the tracks of their predecessors. They would command little attention were it not
that they speak the appealing language of stability in justification of specious formulas. The trouble is that the formulas may encase notions that have never been cleaned and
pressed and might disintegrate if they were. We might not
accept the formulas so readily were we to realize what a
cover they can be for the sin the Bible calls sloth and
associates with ignorance. Whatever the judicial inertia
evinced by a decision enveloped in words that have lost
their magic, it is matched by the profession's indifference
or uncritical acceptance. Thus formula survives by default.
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Stare decisis, to stand by decided cases, conjures up
another phrase dear to Latin lovers - stare super antiquas
vias, to stand on the old paths. One might feel easier about
that word stare if itself it stood by one fixed-star of meaning.
In modern Italian stare means to stay, to stand, to lie, or to
sit, to remain, to keep, to stop, or to wait. With delightful
flexibility it also means to depend, to fit or to suit, to live,
and, of course, to be.
Legal minds at work on this word might well conjecture
that to stare or not to stare depends on whether decisis is
dead or alive. We might inquire into the life of yhat we
are asked to stand by. In the language of stare decisers:
Primo, should it ever have been born? Secundo, is it still
alive? Tertio, does it now deserve to live?
Who among us has not known a precedent that should
never have been born? What counsel does not know a precedent worn so thin and pale with distinctions that the court
has never troubled to overrule it? How many a counsel,
accordingly misled, has heard the court then pronounce
that the precedent must be deemed to have revealed itself
as overruled sub silentio and ruminated in bewilderment
that the precedent on which he relied was never expressly
overruled because it so patently needed to be?
The notion yet persists that the overruling of ill-conceived, or moribund, or obsolete precedents somehow menaces the stability of the law. It is as if we would not remove
barriers on a highway because everyone had become accustomed to circumventing them, and hence traffic moved,
however awkwardly. The implication is that one cannot
render traffic conditions efficient without courting dangers
from the disturbance of established habit patterns. We have
reached such a pass, we are wont to say, that it is for the
legislature and not the court to set matters aright. No one
says it more than the courts themselves.
Why? One speculation is that the popular image of the
legislature as the lawmaking body, in conjunction with a
popular notion of contemporary judges as primarily the
maintenance men of the law, has engendered an auxiliary
notion that whatever incidental law courts create they are
bound to maintain unless the legislature undertakes to
unmake it.
One can speculate further that the occupational caution
of judges makes them reluctant to take the initiative in
overruling a precedent whose unworthiness is concealed in
the aura of stare decisis. It takes boldness to turn a flashlight
upon an aura and call out what one has seen, at the risk of
violating quiet for the benefit of those who have retired
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from active thought. It is easier for a court to rationalize that
less shock will result if it bides its time, and bides it and
bides it, the while it awaits legislative action to transfer an
unfortunate precedent unceremoniously to the dump from
the fading glory in which it has been basking.
Thus courts have maintained their own theatre of the
absurd. For generations since the 1787 rule of Jee v. Audley,8
for example, they earnestly pretended that ancient crones
could have babies. Again, even after the advent of conclusive
blood tests to the contrary, they could still pretend that
anyone might be a father. Flattering though it may have
been to a crone to be viewed as a possible mother of the
year though she would never have a child to show for it, it
can only have been disquieting to a man to be named as an
actual father of someone who was no child of his.
Fortunately all is not saved. In retrospect we come to
see how well courts now and again do clear a trail for those
who come after them. They have significantly expanded the
concept of obligation. They are recognizing a much needed
right to privacy. They are recognizing a right to recovery
for prenatal injuries and intentionally inflicted mental
suffering. They are also recognizing liability once precluded
by charitable or governmental immunities. Their now general acceptance of the manufacturer's liability to third
persons for negligence has stimulated inquiry into appropriate bases for possible strict liability for injuries resulting
from defective products. There is more and more open preoccupation with compensation for personal injuries, which is
bound in turn to augment the scope of insurance.
Courts are also recognizing new responsibilities within
the family as well as new freedoms. They are recognizing
the right of one member of the family to recover against
another. They are recognizing women as people with lives
of their own, transcending their status as somebody else's
spouse or somebody else's mother, transcending somebody
else' s vision of what nonentities they should be.
In conflicts of law, wooden rules are giving way as
surely as wooden boundary lines. Comparable changes are
on the horizon in property law that will reflect new ways
of holding and transferring property, and evolving concepts
of land use, zoning, and condemnation. Criminal law is
beginning to reflect new insights into human behavior.
Landmark cases in constitutional law evince major changes
in the relation of the federal government to the states.
(1787) , 29 E.R. 1186.
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Normally a new judicial rule operates retroactively
and hence governs the instant case. A dilemma arises, however, in the occasional situation where there has been substantial reliance on a precedent that the court now finds
unsound. A court can make its overruling retroactive, a
solution that works hardship on the party that relied but
assures the winning party the benefit of what the court now
declares to be the law. Conversely, it can invoke the solution
approved in Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining
Co.,' applying the old precedent, but giving warning that it
will be supplanted henceforth - a solution that works hard-

ship on the losing party subjected to a precedent declared
unsound, but protects the party that relied. The choice turns
on whether or not the hardship of defeating the reliance of
one party would outweigh the hardship of subjecting the
other to a precedent declared unfit to survive.
The Sunburst solution is appropriate not only to precedents involving the common law but also to those involving
statutory or even constitutional interpretation. The Supreme
Court of California accordingly declared, in a recent case
involving the taxation of a lessee's possessory interest in
tax-exempt government land, that it could apply an overruling decision prospectively only, even though the precedent it thereby temporarily preserved was one that
embodied a mistaken interpretation of the Constitution.
Moreover, that court has recognized that the legislature
can properly move in to assure a Sunburst solution by
statute when it is called upon to balance the hardships in
terms of fairness and public policy.
I take my stand with the modern view that admits of
some exceptions to the usual retroactive operation of judicial
decisions. For all too many generations we justified mechanical retroactivity by the lore descended to us through Blackstone that judges do no more than discover law that marvelously has always existed, awaiting only the right judicial
words to give it verbal life bit by bit. Once suitably
verbalized, such a bit of law would then become automatically retroactive, given the premise that it had been there
all along in the bushes at the bottom of the garden awaiting
discovery and a layette of words.
The devotees of the discovery theory majestically dispelled the reductio ad absurdum of the overruled decision.
The overruling decision simply displaced it all the way back
in time, they said, so that it never had a life it could call its
own. Under the spell of such moonspinning in the mother
country, American courts long dutifully followed suit. They
* (1932), 287 U.S. 358.
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upheld retroactive operation of rules promulgated by judicial decision that they would have invalidated in statutes
as contrary to the ex post facto clause, the impairment of
contracts clause, or the due process clause of the Constitution.
The conviction that a new judicial rule is more just
than an old one is still likely to carry the topheavy inference
that such a rule achieves maximum justice by retroactive
application. There are no questions asked about countervailing injustice to those who have relied on the old rule.
There are also no mind-jolting comparisons with a new
statute, which may also be superior in justice to a judicial
rule that it displaces, but which will ordinarily be construed
to have prospective operation only.
A judicial decision may for good reason specify that it
is to have prospective application only. Whatever the reason
for prospective overruling, the decision is the culmination
of a process involving two issues. First, in the course of
pondering the hitherto governing rule in the context of the
instant case and any relevant predecessor cases, a judge
decides that it is inadequate or inept and must give way to
an appropriately formulated new rule. He must then go on
to decide whether it will operate most justly if it is given
the usual retroactive application to the very case before
him that has proved the impetus toward a new rule. If he
decides against retroactive application, as in a case where it
would work undue hardship upon a party that has justifiably relied on the old rule, he is driven to a dual resolution
of the problem in a bifurcated decision, announcing the new
rule for prospective application only and allowing the old
rule to apply in the case before him.
The very announcement of the new rule for prospective
application only, sounds the death knell of the old one. At
the same time the decision conveys the message that the
winning party wins, not on the basis of a rule marked for
liquidation but despite it. The concern is not to penalize him
unjustly for relying on a rule whose liquidation he could
not reasonably foresee.
Each part of the bifurcated decision springs from the
case itself. The decision to liquidate the old rule springs
from its unfitness to govern such cases. The decision to pay
final respects to the doomed rule springs from such considerations as the justifiability of a party's reliance on an
old rule, given that it may induce reliance by the very
authority of its existence, if not by its fitness.
It bears emphasis that each part of the decision is
essential to a resolution of the case. Neither is dictum. One
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part of the decision announces a new rule that will in the
future supersede the old one and govern such cases as the
instant one. The attendant part adds that the decision will
have no retroactive application. The transitional case marks
the end of the old rule and signals the forthcoming application of the new.
A judge participates significantly in lawmaking whether
he makes repairs and renewals in the common law via the
adaptation of an old precedent or advances its reformation
with a new one. He does so on a variety of fronts, in the
interpretation of statutory or constitutional language as well
as in the analysis of traditional common law problems.
Rare are the statutes that rest in peace beyond the range
of controversy. Large problems of interpretation inevitably
arise. Plain words, like plain people, are not always so plain
as they seem. Certainly a judge is not at liberty to seek
hidden meanings not suggested by the statute or the available extrinsic aids. Speculation cuts brush with the question:
what purpose did the legislature express as it strung its
word into a statute? An insistence upon judicial regard for
the words of a statute does not imply that they are like
words in a dictionary, to be read with no ranging of the
mind. They are no longer at rest in their alphabetical bins.
Released, combined in phrases that imperfectly communicate the thoughts of one man to another, they challenge
men to give them more than passive reading, to consider
well their context, to ponder what may be their consequences. Such a task is not for the phlegmatic. It calls for
judicial temperament, for impassive reflection quickened
with an awareness of the waywardness of words.
There are times when statutory words prove themselves
so at odds with a clear legislative purpose as to pose a
dilemma for the judge. He knows that there is an irreducible
minimum of error in statutes because they deal with multifarious and frequently complicated problems. He hesitates
to undertake correction of even the most obvious legislative
oversight, knowing that theoretically the legislature has
within its power the correction of its own lapses. Yet he also
knows how cumbersome the legislative process is, how
massive the machinery that must be set in motion for even
the smallest correction, how problematic that it will be set
in motion at all, how confusion then may be worse confounded.
With deceptively plain words, as with ambiguous ones,
what a court does is determined in the main by the nature
of the statute. It may be so general in scope as to invite
judicial elaboration. It may evince such careful draftsman-
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ship in the main as to render its errors egregious enough to
be judicially recognized as such, inconsistent with the legislative purpose.
The experienced draftsmen of tax laws, among others,
find it impossible to foresee all the problems that will test
the endurance of their words. They did not foresee, for
example, the intriguing question whether the United States
is a resident of the United States, which arose under a
revenue act taxing interest received by foreign corporations
from such residents. What to do when a foreign corporation
received interest from the United States? Mr. Justice Sutherland decided that this country resided in itself. He found
a spirit willing to take up residence though the flesh was
weak, if indeed not entirely missing. The ingenuity of the
solution compels admiration, whatever misgivings it may
engender as to our self-containment.
So the courts now and again prevent erratic omissions
or errant words from defeating legislative purpose, even
though they thereby disregard conventional canons of construction. We come upon an intriguing but quite different
problem when we consider what should be the fair import
of legislative silence in the wake of statutory interpretation
embodied in the occasional precedent that proves increasingly unsound in the solution of subsequent cases. Barring
those exceptional situations where the entrenched precedent
has engendered so much reliance that its liquidation would
do more harm than good, the court should be free to overrule such a precedent despite legislative inaction.
It is unrealistic to suppose that the legislature can note,
much less deliberate, the effect of each judicial interpretation of a statute, absorbed as it is with forging legislation
for an endless number and variety of problems, under the
constant pressure of considerations of urgency and expediency. The fiction that the failure of the legislature to
repudiate an erroneous judicial interpretation amounts to an
incorporation of that interpretation into the statute not only
assumes that the legislature has embraced something that
it may not even be aware of, but bars the court from reexamining its own errors - consequences as unnecessary
as they are serious.
It is ironic that an unsound interpretation of a statute
should gain strength merely because it has stood unnoticed
by the legislature. It is a mighty assumption that legislative
silence means applause. It is much more likely to mean
ignorance or indifference. Thus time after time a judicial
opinion calls out loud and clear that there is an unresolved
problem or patent injustice that can be remedied only by
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the legislature. The message may be heard round the world
of legal commentators who listen intently for such reports.
Rarely, however, does it reach the ears of legislators across
the clamor and the static of legislative halls. It would be
high comedy, were it not for the sometimes sad repercussions, that we are wont solemnly to attribute significance to
the silence of legislators. There can be idle silence as well
as idle talk.
In spelling out rules that form a Morse code common
to statutes and judicial decisions, and in the United States
common even to the constitution of the country and the
constitutions of the states, courts keep the law straight on
its course. That high responsibility should not be reduced
to a mean task of keeping the law straight and narrow. It
calls for literate, not literal judges.
Hence we should not be misled by the half-truth that
policy is a matter for the legislators to decide. Recurringly
it is also for the courts to decide. There is always an area
not covered by legislation in which they must revise old
rules or formulate new ones, and in that process policy may
be an appropriate and even a basic consideration. The briefs
carry the first responsibility in stating the policy at stake
and demonstrating its relevance; but if they fail or fall short,
no conscientious judge will set bounds to his inquiry. If he
finds no significant clues in the law books, he will not close
his eyes to a pertinent study merely because it was written
by an economist or perhaps an anthropologist or an engineer.
We need not distrust judicial scrutiny of such extralegal
materials. The very independence of judges, fostered by
judicial office even when not guaranteed by tenure, and
their continuous adjustment of sight to varied problems tend
to develop in the least of them some skill in the evaluation
of massive data. They learn to detect latent quackery in
medicine, to question doddered scientific findings, to edit
the swarm spore of the social scientists, to add grains of
salt to the fortune-telling statistics of the economists. Moreover, as with cases or legal theories not covered by the
briefs, they are bound in fairness to direct the attention of
counsel to such materials, if it appears that they may affect
the outcome of the case, and to give them the opportunity
to submit additional briefs. So the miter square of legal
analysis, the marking blades for fitting and joining, reduce
any host of materials to the gist of a legal construction.
Regardless of whether it is attended by abundant or
meager materials, a case may present competing considerations of such closely matched strength as to create a
dilemma. How can a judge then arrive at a decision one
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way or the other and yet avoid being arbitrary? If he has
a high sense of judicial responsibility, he is loath to make
an arbitrary choice even of acceptably rational alternatives,
for he would thus abdicate the responsibility of judgment
when it proved most difficult. He rejects coin-tossing,
though it would make a great show of neutrality. Then
what?
He is painfully aware that a decision will not be saved
from being arbitrary merely because he is disinterested. He
knows well enough that one entrusted with decision, traditionally above base prejudices, must also rise above the
vanity of stubborn preconceptions, sometimes euphemistically called the courage of one's convictions. He knows
well enough that he must severely discount his own predilections, of however high grade he regards them, which is
to say he must bring to his intellectual labors a cleansing
doubt of his omniscience, indeed even of his perception.
Disinterest, however, even disinterest envisaged on a higher
plane than the emotional, is only the minimum qualifications
of a judge for his job. Then what more?
He comes to realize how essential it is also that he be
intellectually interested in a rational outcome. He cannot
remain disoriented forever, his mind suspended between
alternative passable solutions. Rather than to take the easy
way out via one or the other, he can strive to deepen his
inquiry and his reflection enough to arrive at last at a value
judgment as to what the law ought to be and to spell out
why. In the course of doing so he channels his interest in a
rational outcome into an interest in a particular result. In
that limited sense he becomes result-oriented, an honest
term to describe the stubbornly rational search for the
optimum decision. Would we have it otherwise? Would we
give up the value judgment for an abdication of judicial
responsibility, for the toss of the two-faced coin?
It remains to note that the most rational judge will
occasionally be human enough to err. Even the error of such
a judge, however, may prove constructive, given the profound reckoning from which it emerges. For a searching
error is a useful worm, burrowing deep to leaven the hard
ground of tradition that it may nourish new growth as
dogma dies.
In sum, judicial responsibility connotes far more than
a mechanical application of given rules to new sets of facts.
It connotes the recurring formulation of new rules to supplement or displace the old. It connotes the recurring choice
of one policy over another in that formulation, and an articulation of the reasons therefor.
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Even so much, however, constituting the judicial contribution to lawmaking, adds up to no more than interweaving
in the reformation of law. If judges must be much more
than passive mechanics, they must certainly remain much
less than zealous reformers. They would serve justice i by
weaving samplers of law with ambitious designs for reform.
Judges are not equipped for such work, confined as they
are to the close work of imposing design on fragments of
litigation. Dealing as they do with the bits and pieces that
blow into their shop on a random wind, they cannot guess
at all that lies outside their line of vision nor foresee what
may still appear.
As one who has declared himself against the perpetuation of ancient fabrics that no longer shield us from storms,
if they ever did, I should like now to voice a cautionary
postscript against judges rushing in where well-meaning
angels of mercy tread, hawking their new methods of fabrication. The zealots of law reform too often are as indifferent
to exacting standards of quality control as the mechanics of
the status quo. Moreover, we cannot be so tolerant of heedless ventures in new directions in courts as in legislatures,
given the constant risk that judicial error will become
frozen as stare decisis.
We could wish that modern legislatures, often abundantly equipped to carry the main responsibility for lawmaking, would be weaving grand designs of law as informed
and inspired reformers. Instead we must rue with Judge
Friendly: The Gap in Lawmaking - Judges Who Can't and
Legislators Who Won't.5 He laments that "the legislator

has diminished the role of the judge by occupying vast fields
and then has failed to keep them ploughed."
Certainly courts are helpless to stay the maddening
sequences of triumphal entry and sit-in. What is frustration
to them, however, could be challenge to the scholars.
Steeped in special knowledge of one field or another, they
can well place their knowledge at the service of legislatures
for the plowing of the fields, for their sowing and their care.
Who but the scholars have the freedom as well as the
nurturing intellectual environment to differentiate the good
growth from the rubbish and to mark for rejection the
diseased anachronism, the toadstool formula, the scrub of
pompous phrases?
There is a tragic waste in the failure to correlate all
our machinery for vigil to maximum advantage. Is it not
Henry J. Friendly, Benchmarks (University of Chicago Press,
1967), chap. 4.
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time to break the force of habit that militates against steady
communication between legislators in unplowed fields and
scholarly watchbirds in bleachers? It is for no more sinister
reason than lethargy that we have failed in large measure
to correlate the natural resources of legislators who have an
ear to the ground for the preemption of new fields and of
scholars who have an eye on their long-range development.
Perhaps we can make a beginning by calling upon
legislators to take the initiative in establishing permanent
lines of communication. The scholars can hardly take that
initiative, for they are not lobbyists. Why not invite their
ideas through the good offices of a legislative committee
that can insure their careful consideration? Why not, particularly when some legislatures are now equipped with
permanent legislative aids, and here and there law schools
have now set up legal centers, and there remains only to
set up permanent lines of communication between them?
The natural agency for such communication is a law revision
commission such as those long since established in New
York and California or the ones established for England and
Scotland by the 1965 Law Commissions Act.
A law school offers an ideal environment for such a
commission. It could there devote itself wholeheartedly to
the formulation and drafting of statutes as well as to continuing re-examination of their fitness for survival. It could
withstand the prevailing winds of pressure groups as it
made timely use of the abundant, wasting assets of scholarly
studies. One can hardly imagine more valuable interchange
for the law than that between those entrusted to review it
critically and those entrusted to draft proposals for its
revision. On a wide front they could collaborate in longrange studies of legal needs that would richly complement
the applied research that legislatures recurringly ask of
their legislative aids. In turn the work of the commissions
would offer hearty sustenance not only to the law reviews
but to all the other projects of a law school, not the least
of which is the classroom. Such permanent relationships
between law schools and law revision commissions, going
far beyond today's occasional associations, would strengthen
their beneficent influence on legislation.
Perhaps the story of law reform would get better as it
went along if scholars steadily established quality controls
for the weaving of law, spurring legislators to legislate when
necessary and to legislate well, and untangling the problems
that advance upon courts, to smooth the task of judicial
decision. There comes to mind a story of pioneering times
called The Weaver's Children, which begins: "Many years
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ago a little wooden mill stood in a ravine. . .. The little mill
filled the space between a rushing stream and a narrow
road."
The mill might symbolize the world of scholars, in law
schools or on law revision commissions, in legislatures or
courts, as well as in public or private practice. The weavers
in the mill would keep a weather eye out for the volume
and course of the rushing stream, of life itself, to calculate
the tempo for the weaving of statutes. They would also
keep a weather eye out for traffic conditions on the narrow
road, estimating therefrom the tempo at which motley
caravans could unload their variegated sacks of litigation.
The mill would be a model of rational methods of weaving.
One might envisage such a development less as a happy
ending to the story of law reform than as an ideal way for
it to be continued. So I have thought, in saying now and
again, that the law will never be built in a day, and with
luck it will never be finished.

